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Abstract 
Non-performing loans has always been a serious concern for the banking system in Vietnam over the years, 
especially after the financial crisis year 2008. The huge volume of non-performing loans may lead to severe 
consequences for the whole economy at both macroeconomic and microeconomic level. The determinants of the 
NPLs problems are identified by building up models that explain non-performing loans by macroeconomic factors 
and bank-specific factors which are adjusted from the earlier studies to fit with the context in Vietnam. In short, 
the level of NPLs is primarily contributed by bank-specific factors. Also, it is recommended that banks should 
improve lending policies to prevent the increase in non-performing loans. Last but not least, it is urgent for the 
State Bank of Vietnam in general and banks themselves in particular to conduct a strict procedure in 
implementation, control, management, and supervision of all activities in order to carry out solutions in time before 
the problems are getting worse.   
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1. Introduction 
It is undeniable that banks play an important role in the economy system of each country across the globe, 
especially in Vietnam, where more than 100 banks are operating according to figure from State Bank of Vietnam 
in year-end 2018. Besides, credit risk is always extremely important to banking industry since its core business is 
formed by lending operations. Credit risk or default risk depends on the quality of assets, and it is reflected through 
the volume of non-performing loans (NPLs). Various researches and literatures have showed that both emerging 
and matured economies have to deal with a significant increase in problem of NPLs. In the past, Vietnam also used 
to confront with severe issue related to NPLs which raised serious threats to the whole economy, especially the 
financial crisis in 2008, and it still remains a big concern these days. Hence, it is essential to determine the factors 
causing NPLs and develop an effective resolution for the overall banking industry in general, and listed banking 
sector in particular. 
With the purpose of identify the determinants related to NPLs in banking sector in Vietnam, this paper 
concentrates on establishing a quantitative model that can explain the NPLs level by using macroeconomic and 
bank-specific factors. It and then provides some recommendations to improve the situation, reducing the increase 
in NPLs level and avoiding bad debt crisis. The research consists of six sections: Introduction, Banking situation, 
Literature review, Research methodology, Data analysis, results and discussions, and Summary, conclusion and 
recommendations. 
As stated above, NPLs and listed banks not only is closely related to each other but they also have an important 
role in the economy in Vietnam. Therefore, it raises some questions as follows: What are the determinants of NPLs 
in listed banking sector in Vietnam? What recommendations for banks is driven from this model to prevent the 
increase in NPLs level and avoid bad debt crisis? 
This research seeks to determine the effects of macroeconomic and bank-specific factors on non- performing 
loan of listed banking sector in Vietnam’s Stock Exchange. 
The major beneficiaries of this research are: the banks’ management, the credit ratings institutions, and the 
external stakeholders who are interested in knowledge of NPLs level of listed banking sector in Vietnam. The 
findings are to help managers and directors of banks in identifying causes and predicting trends of NPLs in their 
bank itself and in the whole country. It also assists in understanding the role of NPLs and listed banks in the 
economy. Moreover, the research aids in making decision on lending procedure and provisioning policy to lower 
NPLs and reduce related losses, as well as ensure best quality loans are extended. 
The paper organizes as follows: the first section, Introduction, will present an overview about NPLs and listed 
banking sectors situations in Vietnam, as well as research questions and its contribution. Section 2 reviews some 
theoretical frameworks and different qualitative and recommendations for the banks, as well as points out the 
limitation of this research. 
 
2. International banking standard Basel 
Basel Accords are a set of international banking regulations put forth by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
(BCBS) that provides recommendations on banking regulations in regards to capital risk, market risk, and 
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operational risk. The purpose of the accords is to ensure that financial institutions have enough capital on account 
to meet obligations and absorb unexpected losses. 
The reason why Capital Adequacy Ratio is critical is because CAR make sure banks have enough cushion to 
absorb a reasonable amount of losses before they become insolvent and consequently lose depositors’ funds, thus 
it ensures the efficiency and stability of financial system by reducing the insolvent risk of bank. Therefore, a bank 
with a high capital adequacy ratio is considered safe and likely to meet its financial obligations. 
State Bank of Vietnam has issued some regulations about capital adequacy ratio. Some of them are Circular 
13/2010/TT-NHNN on May 20, 2010, Circular 36/2014/TT-NHNN on November 20, 2014, and Circular 
36/2014/TT-NHNN on November 20, 2014. The most recent one is Circular 41/2016/TT-NHNN which adjust 
CAR from 9% to 8% but supplementing other capital requirements. This Circular will take effect from January 1, 
2020. 
Basel II is the second international banking regulatory accord issued by BCBS in 2004 with the aim of 
overcome shortcomings of Basel I by making capital requirements more risk sensitive. In fact, Basel I primary 
focused on credit risk, while Basel II includes three major components of risk that a bank faces: credit risk, 
operational risk and market risk. The framework of Basel I contains three pillars: (i) minimum capital requirements 
(Pillar 1); (ii) Supervisory review process (Pillar 2); and (iii) Market Discipline (Pillar 3). 
 
3. Literature review on determinants of NPLs 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Although there is not specific theory which properly presents about NPLs, this section of literature reviews covers 
the theories that is most likely to relate to the research question and explain concept as well as the components 
affecting NPLs of banks. There are four appropriate theories, which are the Stakeholder theory, Risk Management 
theory, Adverse Selection theory, and Moral Hazard theory. 
Stakeholder theory and Risk Management theory 
A stakeholder approach to strategy emerged in the mid-1980’s and its focal point was the Stakeholder theory, first 
proposed by Freeman (1984). The Stakeholder theory focuses on equilibrium of both moral and ethical values in 
the management of a business or other organization, which suggests that a company’s real success comes from 
satisfying all its stakeholders including just about anyone affected by the company and its operation (Kubai, 2016). 
Loosemore and Phua (2010) also states that the theory is largely involved in the risk management decision-making 
processes, and thus provides diversified feasible rationale for risk management such as bad debt. 
Meanwhile, it is often argued that performance is linked to the firm’s default risk (Shapiro and Titman, 1986) and 
the risk management function within the organization would be responsible for the direct management of the risk 
management policy of the entity, which causes high loan default (Spikin, 2013), and to some extent, affects the 
bad debt ratio. 
The Stakeholder theory and Risk Management theory is closely relevant to the research because it highlights 
the relationship between organization’s performance and NPLs through stakeholders and daily activities. 
Adverse Selection theory 
According to Lambert et al., (2011), the theory of asymmetric information explains how it is difficult to distinguish 
between good or bad borrowers and thus results in adverse selection and moral hazards issues. The theory refers 
generally to a situation of unequal knowledge (information failure) in which a party possesses more information 
on specific item to be transacted than the other party, leading to a more favorable position for negotiation. The 
party with less information is consequently likely to make either right or wrong decision related to the transaction 
(Auronen, 2003). Therefore, adverse selection is one of the reasons leading to considerable growth in bad debt for 
banks (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2003). 
This theory is relevant to the research as it exposes the primary cause of NPLs. In this case, both parties, the 
lender and the borrower possibly play the role of either the more-information side or the less-information side. 
Banks can charge interest rates that are unfavorable to borrowers and borrowers can also conceal their information 
and leave banks with a subprime loan, which increases the default risk and contributes to the bad debt ratio. 
Moral Hazard theory 
Moral Hazard theory and Adverse Selection theory are both based on the theory of asymmetric information 
(incomplete information). However, the Moral Hazard is more about an ethical issue in which a party has an 
incentive to take risks without taking responsibility when entering into a transaction. They may provide misleading 
information or change their behavior because they believe they will avoid any consequences arising from their 
actions (Holmstrom, 1982). Both Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Cincinelli (2017) implicitly suggests that moral 
hazard problems within banking sector result in a higher loan growth rate and a larger number of NPLs. A typical 
example is the financial crisis in 2008, when banks wanted to boost their growth rate by issuing subprime mortgage 
lending, along with low interest rates. They ignored the interplay of growth and risk, which led to financial bubbles 
and it ended with unprecedented losses and bankruptcy of the global economy (Cincinelli, 2017). 
On the other hand, there might be a risk that the borrower could either intentionally or accidentally engage in 
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activities that are undesirable from the lender’s perspective, which means he is less likely to pay back the loan 
despite the imminent future consequences. The most appropriate answer is that the borrower knows that someone 
else will have to take the responsibility for the mistake he makes. All of these actions are described as moral hazard 
and gradually lead to the growth in bad debt ratio. 
 
3.2 Determinants of Non-Performing Loans 
With the existing finance literature, most of which are based on country-specific studies and researches, it is widely 
believed that NPLs problem arises as a result of two components, which are macroeconomic and microeconomic 
factors. For instance, Sinkey and Greenwalt (1991) indicates that both bank-specific (internal) and macroeconomic 
(external) factors are the main causes of bad debt in the United States. The internal factors are diversified and 
become specific to a particular bank, individually influencing the level of NPLs. They are most likely to be driven 
bank’s management and performance, while the external factors are out of the control of a bank. They might 
diverse in level of sector, industry, country or worldwide. 
Macroeconomic factors causing NPLs 
Many previous studies have proved that an increase in real GDP adversely affects the financial sector performance, 
and NPLs in particular. Ranjan and Dhal (2003) examine the coupling of credit risk of public sector banks in India, 
and found a significant negative relationship between real GDP and NPLs. As explained by Warue (2013) and Dao 
and Do (2013), a growth in real GDP usually generates more income, which strengthens the debt financing capacity 
of borrowers, resulting in lower default risk of the debt, and thus, contributes to lower NPLs. On the contrary, 
when the economy experiences a recession, the level of NPLs should increase. In addition, the same relationship 
was also identified through the studies conducted by Das and Ghosh (2003), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Boss et 
al., (2009), Nkusu (2011), Ekanayake and Azeez (2015) and Ekanayake (2018). 
Besides, there are significant empirical evidences concluding that NPLs are highly sensitive to inflation rate. 
In 2005, based on a granger-causality in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, Fofack reveals that 
inflationary pressure is a possible contributor to the high level of impaired loans. Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006) analyze the household NPLs in some European countries and stated that NPLs level has a positive 
relationship with inflation rate. Similarly, Ta et al., (2018) prove that inflation rate moves along with NPLs level 
in joint-stock commercial banks sector in Vietnam. When inflation rate escalates, government will tighten the 
fiscal and monetary policies, which weakens the ability to service the debt and increase the probability of default. 
However, contrary to previous findings, Ekanayake and Azeez (2015) find that inflation of the economy has a 
strongly negative impact on NPLs of the Sri Lanka commercial banks system. 
Interest rates were also identified as a significant contributor for commercial banks’ non- performing loans. 
Berge and Boye (2007) also find that real interest rates have a strong impact on problem loans for the Nordic 
banking system over the period 1993 – 2005. A decline in real interest rate will lead to a decline in the volume of 
problem loans. Likewise, Jimenez and Saurina (2006) and Espinoza and Prasad (2010) also ascertain the 
macroeconomic determinants of NPLs. The empirical evidences support the view that NPLs level worsens since 
economic growth becomes lower, resulting in the increase in lending interest rates and risk aversion. Furthermore, 
Dao and Do (2013) explain that the higher prime lending rate will increase the cost of loan charged on borrowers, 
which forces them to bear higher financial default risk, which in turn increases the NPLs. 
Another macroeconomic determinant of NPLs which needs to be considered is the unemployment rate. As to 
Berge and Boye (2007), NPLs have a significant positive influence from unemployment rate. It indicates that 
increasing trend in unemployment rate is translated into higher bad debt level. Similarly, Boss et al., (2009) and 
Nkusu (2011) also provide the same empirical results: there is a positive and significant relationship between 
unemployment rates spread and NPLs level in Austria. The findings concur with Nkusu's (2011) findings where 
he concluded that unemployment rates affect the ability to fulfill the debt obligation of borrowers, and thus 
increasing the level of NPLs. 
Bank-specific factors causing NPLs 
Many previous studies have been conducted to identify the relationship between NPLs and some bank-specific 
factors. For example, in the studies on NPLs in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fofack (2005) emphasizes the relationship of 
NPLs with economic growth, interbank loans, real exchange rate appreciation, real interest rate, and net interest 
rate. After that, while investing the roots of bad debt, Louzis et al., (2012) have demonstrated a strong causality 
between bad debt and return to equity ratio, non-interest income, size, leverage ratio, inefficiency, loan growth and 
interest expense ratio. The recent study done by N. Ekanayake (2018) concludes that nine variables including ratio 
of NPLs, ratio of net income, growth in the number of bank branches, ratio of non-interest income, dummy variable 
for ownership, annual growth in real GDP, prime lending rate, interest rate spread, and annual inflation rate have 
a relationship with NPLs in Sri Lanka. 
There are significant empirical results finding that banks’ profitability is a determinant of NPLs. The studies 
conducted by Aziz et al., (2009), as well as Akter and Roy (2017) about all the impacts on NPLs in general and 
on bank sector of Dhaka Stock Exchange in particular respectively have identified that there is a sustainable 
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relationship between NPLs and bank’s profitability. The increase in NPLs will lower the profitability and vice 
versa. Furthermore, Warue (2013) highlights the significantly negative correlation of NPLs towards return on 
assets when doing a research on state of NPLs in Kenya. Similarly, Ta et al., (2018) also indicate that profitability 
in term of ROE has a 10% adversely impact on NPLs in joint-stock commercial bank sector in Vietnam. However, 
in a recent research in Sri Lanka context in 2015, Ekanayake and Azeez conclude that bank’s profitability is not a 
significant factor causing NPLs. 
Also, empirical literature also gives evidence for banks about the relationship between NPLs and non-interest 
income. According to DeYoung and Rice (2004), non-interest income is considered when assessing the credit risk. 
In particular, non-interest income increases bank’s profitability, and thus increases the default risk which results 
in bad debt. Another study done by N. Ekanayake (2018) has the same conclusion that non-interest income is still 
positive in determining NPLs in Sri Lanka. However, as explained by Dao and Do (2013), high non-interest income 
will demonstrate that the banks are well-diversified and the overall risk is low; therefore, they have a negative 
relationship. 
The other factor causing NPLs is the bank’s size. Warue (2013) identified that there is a significant 
relationship between them. Dao and Do (2013) found that an increase of 1% in size will lead to a growth of 0.2125% 
in NPLs in bank sector in Vietnam. On the contrary, Ta et al., (2018) state that size has an adverse impact on NPLs. 
However, this result is not statistically significant. Louzis et al., (2012) explain that increase in size may result in 
counter-tendencies to the degree of risk-taking. For instance, larger banks may engage in activities that are 
inherently riskier compared to the activities of smaller banks; therefore, larger size is not likely to lower the credit 
risk. 
The fourth aspect that needs to be considered is leverage ratio. Mentioned by Louzis et al., (2012) when they 
identify the macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of NPLs in Greece, the empirical results implied that 
in leverage tends to increase NPLs, but this effect occurs only to a certain size threshold. After that threshold, 
leverage does not have any statistically significant effect on NPLs. However, according to Dao and Do (2013), 
leverage has a positive impact on NPLs in all circumstances when they conduct a quantitative analysis of bad debt 
in Vietnam. 
In addition, there are many statistical evidences about the relationship between NPLs and inefficiency due to 
bad management. Louzis et al., (2012) ascertain that management inefficiency from previous years sustainably 
affect the current level of bad deb. In detail, Dao and Do (2013) found that there is a negative relationship between 
them. On the other hand, Abid et al., (2014) indicate that in most of the models in the studies, inefficiency factor 
positively influences NPLs, which means that an increase in inefficiency variable leads to an increase in NPLs 
level. 
Concurrently, in the studies done by Louzis et al., (2012), there are also empirical results of banks’ risk 
attitude, as proxied by the solvency ratio. However, they do not find a significant evidence about the relationship 
between solvency ratio and NPLs with the explanation that the number of banks in Greece is small enough that 
regulatory authorities can have a precise overview of the riskiness of each bank’s loan portfolio and thus easily 
intervene accordingly. However, applying in a market with large number of banks as Vietnam and the proxy is 
banks’ equity, Ta et al., (2018) indicate that each one unit increase in equity will lead to 0.576 unit increase in 
NPLs level. They believe that ineffective equity management is the main reason to explain why equity growth can 
worsen bad debt situation of a bank. 
Based on literature evidence, the ownership structure is also an aspect that would affect the level of NPLs of 
bank sector. When examining the relationship between NPLs and ownership structure of commercial banks in 
Taiwan et al., (2006) found that the rate of NPLs decreases as government shareholding increases of a bank up to 
64 percent and thereafter it increases. However, Warue (2013) indicate that state-owned banks are likely to have 
a higher NPLs ratio because of the vulnerability to political lobbying and administrative pressure. Meanwhile, 
Ekanayake (2018) has proved that the ownership structure is not a significant determinant. 
Another cause has been demonstrated to have a negative relationship with NPLs is the level of non- 
performing loans from previous years. The studies conducted by Blanco and Gimeno (2012) and Louzis et al., 
(2012) imply that NPLs are likely to decrease when they have increased in the previous quarter. The findings 
concur with Abid et al., (2014) where they also conclude that the current level of bad debt is adversely influenced 
by the previous one. In particular, Ta et al., (2018) indicate that when the previous NPLs of a bank increase by one 
unit, the current NPLs will increase by 30.8 units. 
Besides, to be more suitable with the Vietnam’s banking sector in particular, Dao and Do (2013) have 
included two other determinants with the aim to explain the specific features of Vietnam. The two determinants 
are loan growth and interest expense ratio, both of which have a positive relationship on NPLs. When the interest 
expense ratio become higher, resulting from higher deposit rate, banks compensate such expenditure by increasing 
the corresponding lending rates and providing more loans (increase in loan growth rate). This phenomenon will 
lower the debt servicing capacity of borrowers, thus boost the level of bad debt. 
In summary, it is clear that the phenomenon of NPLs is experienced by commercial banks all over the world 
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with extensive statistically significant evidences. It can be seen that there are three main literature gaps emanating 
from these studies when conducting a quantitative analysis about NPLs of listed banking sector in Vietnam. 
There is a lack of a proper theoretical model for NPLs. All the reviewed frameworks including Stakeholder 
theory, Risk Management theory, Adverse Selection theory, and Moral Hazard theory are just most likely to relate 
to bad debt, but none of them directly explains the causes of NPLs; 
Even though there are many international empirical reviews about determinants of NPLs with same 
explanation direction, external and internal factors, they have given different results on how these factors affect 
bad debt level; 
Studies that did earlier focused on the general banking sector in Vietnam and used a few numbers of banks 
as a sample and a small duration. There has not been a proper quantitative analysis about bad debt in banking 
sector in Vietnam’s Stock Exchange yet. Moreover, the investigated duration of these studies usually includes the 
financial crisis year 2008, so it is necessary to test the earlier models in the period after 2008; 
These studies are working with former data and their scales are not too big. Besides, although they apply the 
approach of macro – micro determinants to clarify NPLs, the dataset is not panel data. In addition, these studies’ 
models (e.g., the analyses conducted by Dao and Do (2013) and Ta et al., (2018)) are simple and omit some factors 
such as unemployment, capital ratio, and ownership structure. 
 
4. Research methodology 
This research aims to contribute to the gap in this field by covering all 17 listed banks in Vietnam and finding a 
model to perform the aspect of NPLs. 
The conceptual framework is summarized and developed from the research questions and literature review. 
It indicates the relationship between NPLs in listed banking sector in Vietnam (dependent factors) and the causes 
including macroeconomic and bank-specific factors (independent factors). It is presented diagrammatically as 
shown below. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of NPLs in listed banking sector in Vietnam 
 
4.1 Population and Sample 
The population for the research is all the commercial banks in Vietnam. According to State Bank of Vietnam, at 
year-end 2018, there are total 46 commercial banks: 4 state-owned banks, 31 joint- stock banks, 9 wholly foreign-
owned banks, and 2 joint-venture banks. 
The sample for the study includes all 17 listed joint-stock commercial banks on the Vietnam Stock Exchange. 
Listed banking sector is chosen because of information availability and its significant role in the economy. 
The study covered the period from 2009 to 2018 for 17 joint-stock commercial banks. NPLs are presented by 
two components, macroeconomic and bank-specific factors. There is an aggregated test for the effect on NPLs of 
each component. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
The data has been collected from the annual audited reports of 17 listed banks in the website of Vietstock 
(https://finance.vietstock.vn/), World Economic Outlook and The World Bank | Data from the period year 2009 – 
2018, after the financial crisis in 2008. The data set consists of two categories, acquired and computed figures. In 
detail, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, Inflation rate, Prime lending rate, Unemployment rate were 
tracked from World Economic Outlook and The World Bank | Data. Besides, the ratios for computing; Profitability, 
Non-interest income, Size, Leverage, Inefficiency, Capital ratio, Loan growth rate, Ownership structure and 
Interest Expense ratio were calculated from the financial statements of the listed banks for period under study. A 
data collection excel sheet named “Data set” was prepared to assist in gathering the data. 
 
4.3 Variables 
The variables chosen for the model was guided by three earlier studies. The first study is “Macroeconomic and 
bank-specific determinants of NPLs in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan 
 
determinants 
Non- 
loans 
Bank-specific 
determinants 
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portfolios” conducted by Louzis et al., (2012). The study has proved the relationship between NPLs and NPLs 
from previous periods, GDP growth rate, Unemployment rate, Inefficiency, Solvency ratio, Return on equity, Size, 
Noninterest income, Leverage ratio and size, and Ownership concentration. 
The second guided study is “Bad debts in Vietnamese banks: Quantitative Analysis and Recommendations” 
done by Dao and Do (2013). In their model, there are six statistically significant variables, which are NPLs from 
previous periods, Interest expense ratio, Size, Noninterest income, Return on Equity, and Inefficiency. 
The last study, “The Impact of Bank-specific and Macroeconomic Factors on NPLs in Sri Lanka Commercial 
Banks”, conducted by Ekanayake (2018) also pointed out that Return on Assets, Growth in number of bank 
branches, Non-interest income, GDP growth rate, Prime lending rate of the economy, Interest rate spread, and 
Annual inflation growth are the factors that affect the level of NPLs. 
Table 1: Interpretation of each variable and expected sign 
Macroeconomic factors 
Expected 
sign 
Reference 
1 
GDP growth 
rate 
GDPG 
The annual growth in real 
GDP in year t 
(-) 
Louzis et al., 
(2012) 
2 Inflation rate INF 
The annual inflation rate 
in year t 
(+) 
Dao and Do 
(2013) and 
Ekanayake 
(2018) 
3 
Prime lending 
rate 
LIR 
Prime lending rate in year 
t 
(+) 
Dao and Do 
(2013) and 
Ekanayake 
(2018) 
4 
Unemployment 
rate 
UNER 
Unemployment rate in 
year t 
(+)  
Bank-specific factors   
5 Profitability  ROE =
Profit
Total Equity
 
Ratio of net income to 
total asset at bank i at 
year t 
(-)  
6 
Non-interest 
income 
NII
=
Noninterest income
Total income
 
Ratio of non-interest 
income to total income of 
bank i at year t 
(-)  
7 Banks’ size 
SIZE
= log(Total assets) 
Natural logarithm of total 
assets of bank i at year t 
(+) 
Dao and Do 
(2013) 
8 Leverage ratio LR =
Total liabilities
Total assets
 
Ratio of total liabilities to 
total asset of bank i at 
year t 
(+)  
9 Inefficiency 
INEF
=
Operating expense
Operating income
 
Ratio of operating 
expense to operating 
income of bank i at year t 
(-) 
Dao and Do 
(2013) 
10 Capital ratio 
CAPR
=
Owned capital
Total assets
 
Ratio of owned capital to 
total asset of bank i at 
year t  
(-)  
11 
Ownership 
structure 
STATE 
Dummy variable for 
ownership where state-
owned banks equal 1 
otherwise 0 
(-)  
12 
Non-performing 
loans from 
previous year 
NPLs 
Ratio of NPLs to total 
loans for bank i at year t-1 
(+)  
13 
Loan growth 
rate 
LGR
=
Loan − Loan-.
Loan-.
 
Ratio of the difference 
between the outstanding 
loans of one year and that 
of the previous year to the 
previous year outstanding 
loan for bank i at time t 
(+)  
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Macroeconomic factors 
Expected 
sign 
Reference 
14 
Interest expense 
ratio 
IER
=
Interest expense
Total deposit
 
Ratio of interest expense 
to total deposit of bank i 
at year t 
(+) 
Dao and Do 
(2013) 
(Source: Louziz, Dao and Do, Ekanayake) 
5. Data analysis, results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of all the variables 
 NPLs GDPG INF LIR UNER ROE NII LR INEF CAPR LGR IER 
Mean 0.0203 0.0610 0.0667 0.1013 0.0301 0.1037 0.0555 0.9133 1.0142 0.0703 0.3469 0.0843 
Median 0.0179 0.0623 0.0565 0.0937 0.0254 0.1054 0.0558 0.9217 0.4842 0.0604 0.2169 0.0715 
Maximum 0.1321 0.0681 0.1868 0.1695 0.0460 0.2682 0.2044 0.9594 86.302 0.2994 10.519 0.3927 
Minimum 0.0002 0.0525 0.0088 0.0696 0.0210 -0.82 0.0027 0.7327 0.0602 0.0262 -0.30 0.0262 
Std. Dev. 0.0148 0.0054 0.0475 0.0327 0.0098 0.0932 0.0390 0.0381 6.5816 0.0384 0.8233 0.0501 
(Source: Results from EViews 10) 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of 14 variables from 17 listed banks for the years 2009 - 2018. 
NPL was the dependent variable. Data was obtained using EViews 10. Besides, there are also histogram and 
density plots for each variable, transferred from R. 
NPL, the dependent variable, has a mean of 2.03%. This suggests that banks could not collect 2.03% of every 
loan given. The highest NPLs are 13.21% belonging to SHB in 2011 while the lowest are 0.02% coming from 
TPBank in 2011. It follows a highly right-skewed distribution, which means the tail on the right side of the 
distribution is longer and flatter, and its mean and median is greater than the mode. NPLs also experience a high 
kurtosis, which may indicate that it has many outliers. NPLs will be more deeply investigated in the part of 
Discussion of findings. 
All the macroeconomic factors have a positive skewness except GDP growth rate, whose mean equals 6.10%. 
The maximum value is 6.81% acquired in 2017, and the minimum value is 5.25% in 2012. The skewness of GDP 
growth rate is -0.37, between -0.5 and 0.5, so its data is fairly symmetrical. It also follows platykurtic distribution 
because the kurtosis is smaller than 3. 
Meanwhile, inflation experiences highly right-skewed data because the skewness is greater than 1. Inflation 
rate is also illustrated with leptokurtic distribution (kurtosis > 3). It is because its mean is 6.67%, and it reached 
the peak at 18.68% in 2011 when in 2015, it had the smallest value at 0.88%. 
Prime lending rate and unemployment rate has the same type of distribution. In general, they follow the 
moderately positive skewness as the skewness is between 0.5 and 1. In term of kurtosis, prime lending rate and 
unemployment rate all have platykurtic distribution. In particular, prime lending rate’s mean equals 10.13% with 
the highest value of 16.95% in 2011 and the lowest value of 6.96% in 2016. Unemployment rate experiences a 
mean of 3.01% with the highest value of 4.60% in 2009 and the lowest value of 2.10% in 2014. 
Besides, there are only two out of seven bank-specific factors having a negative skewness, which are Return 
on Equity and Leverage ratio. The other variables are Non-interest income, Inefficiency, Capital ratio, Loan growth 
rate, and Interest expense ratio follow right-skewed distribution. All seven bank-specific factors are presented 
under leptokurtic distribution, whose tails are fatter and peaks are higher and sharper. Inefficiency and Loan growth 
rate experience an extremely high kurtosis compared to others, which means that they have a very high volatility. 
Specifically, return on equity has a mean of 10.37%. The maximum value equals 26.82% by ACB in 2011, 
while the minimum value is -0.82 by TPBank in 2011. Noninterest income has a mean of 5.55%. Its highest value 
is 20.44% acquired by Techcombank in 2017, and the lowest value is 0.27% by Kienlongbank in 2012. In term of 
leverage ratio, both BIDV and VietinBank have the highest number of 0.9594 in the same year, 2017, while 
VPBank has the smallest number of 0.7327 in 2016. It can be seen that the mean of leverage ratio is 0.9133, very 
close with the highest value. The mean of efficiency equals 1.0142. In detail, the lowest value is 0.0602 by 
Techcombank in 2015, and the highest one as well as the outlier of the data is 86.3019 by TPBank in 2011. Capital 
ratio has a mean of 7.03%. BIDV and VietinBank one more time together have the smallest value of 2.62% in 
2018 and TPBank has the highest value of 29.94% in 2012. The mean of loan growth rate equals 0.3469. TPBank 
has both the highest and the lowest value of 10.5186 in 2009 and - 0.3010 in 2011 respectively. The last variable 
is interest expense ratio with the mean of 0.0843. TPBank again has both the highest value of 0.3927 in 2011 and 
the lowest value of 0.0262 in 2018. 
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Figure 2: Histogram and density plot of selected variables 
 
 
Figure 3: Histogram and density plot of bank-specific factors 
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Covariance and correlation Analysis 
The correlation and covariance are presented as follows. 
Table 3: Ordinary covariance analysis single table in EViews 10 
Correlation             
Probability NPLs  GDPG  INF  LIR  UNER  ROE  NII  LR  INEF  CAPR  LGR  IER   
NPLs  1.0000             
GDPG  -0.2280 1.0000            
INF  0.1388 -0.2964 1.0000           
LIR  0.1709 -0.3795 0.9486 1.0000          
UNER  -0.0396 -0.2709 0.7476 0.7277 1.0000         
ROE  -0.0825 0.0763 -0.0065 -0.0253 0.1017 1.0000        
NII  -0.0154 0.1711 -0.1621 -0.2122 -0.0286 0.3367 1.0000       
LR  -0.0675 0.2288 -0.1612 -0.1999 -0.2000 0.0626 0.1246 1.0000      
INEF  -0.0994 0.0185 0.1907 0.1571 0.1110 -0.7734 -0.0902 0.0406 1.0000     
CAPR  0.0716 -0.2973 0.2303 0.2922 0.2546 -0.2842 -0.3157 -0.8444 0.1023 1.0000    
LGR  -0.0790 -0.1585 0.0113 0.0093 0.2195 0.0426 -0.0481 -0.1904 -0.0632 0.2090 1.0000   
IER  0.0786 -0.1624 0.7661 0.7538 0.5178 -0.3585 -0.3140 -0.1872 0.4746 0.2943 -0.0692 1.0000  
(Source: Results from Eviews 10) 
Correlation is a standardized scale of -1 to +1, which is utilized to determine the direction of a linear 
relationship between two variables. As can be seen from the table 3, NPLs has a positive relationship with Inflation 
rate, Prime lending rate, Capital ratio, and Interest expense ratio. It is negatively related to GDP growth rate, 
Unemployment rate, Noninterest income, Leverage ratio, Inefficiency, and Loan growth rate. Based on the results, 
GDP growth rate affects NPLs most, while Noninterest income has the least influence on it. 
 
5.2 Empirical results 
5.2.1 Initial model 
Applying pooled regression model for the initial 14 variables, the initial model will be: 
Model 1: 
NPLs = 0.02607 - 0.0165*GDPG + 0.0774*INF + 0.1102*LIR - 0.4246*UNER - 0.0544*ROE 
+ 0.04303*NII + 0.0009*LOG(SIZE) - 0.0323*LR - 0.0008*INEF - 0.0002*CAPR 
- 0.0010*STATE + 0.0017*LGR - 0.0016*IER + 0.4468*NPLs(-1) 
R-squared 0.389016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327032 
F-statistic 6.276088 
It can be seen that although the R-squared and adjusted R-squared is relatively high (38.9% and 32.7% 
relatively), there are only three out of fourteen variables which are significant: ROE, INEF, and NPLs(-1). F-
statistic is very high with low p-value; therefore, there is enough statistic evidence to conclude that at least one 
parameter is different from zero, which means Model 1 provides a better fit than the intercept-only model. Besides, 
Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to 2, so it can be implied that there is no first order autocorrelation in this 
model. 
Meanwhile, the intercept, GDPG, INF, LIR, UNER, NII, LOG(SIZE), LR, CAPR, STATE, LGR, 
and IER are not statistically significant due to small p-value. In particular, GDPG, LIR, LR, LGR, IER, and 
CAPR have the highest p-value. It can be explained that the factor such as prime lending rates are not suitable for 
the context in Vietnam because banks always offer similar interest rates to compete with each other. Likewise, the 
effect of GDP growth rate and the other bank-specific factors above on the debt-servicing ability and the volume 
of bad debt respectively can vary greatly among different types of loans. STATE, the dummy one, is kept to see 
the interaction among variables later. 
The next step we used the model to test the redundant variables (mean significant variables), errors testing 
(heteroskedaticity, multicollinearity, autocorrelation) change of functional forms of variables add interaction 
among variables, check three models: Pooled, REM, FEM 
5.2.2 Hausman test and Redundant Fixed Effects test 
p value for INF, UNER, ROE, LOG(SIZE), INEF, STATE, NPLs(-1), STATE*ROE are 0.0000, 0.0236, 0.0028, 
0.0001, 0.0007, 0.0798, 0.0000, 0.0127 respectively. 
NPLs = 0.0927*INF - 0.2146*UNER - 0.0352*ROE + 0.0006*LOG(SIZE) - 0.0006*INEF 
- 0.0033*STATE + 0.6435*NPLs(-1) + 0.0370*STATE*ROE 
R-squared 0.584865 
Adjusted R-squared 0.564824 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.098470 
Heteroskedaticity LR Test is the suggested model with the weighted statistics by EViews 10 after the error 
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test. It can be seen that both R-squared and adjusted R-squared have increased significantly. In detail, R-squared 
increased from 38.18% to 58.49%, while adjusted R-squared soared from 34.74% up to 56.48%. Durbin-Watson 
statistic is even closer to 2, so there is enough evidence to conclude that there is no first autocorrelation. 
There are now seven out of eight variables which are significant. In detail, INF has a p-value of 0.00. UNER 
has a p-value of 0.0236. ROE has a p-value of 0.0028. LOG(SIZE) has a p-value of 0.0001. INEF has a p-value 
of 0.0007. NPLs(-1) has a p-value of 0.00. STATE*ROE has a p-value of 0.0127. Although STATE is not 
significant but its p-value equals 0.0798, very close to 0.05, STATE may be considered as a significant variable. 
 
5.3 Discussion of findings 
5.3.1 Effect of macroeconomic factors on NPLs 
According to the result from EViews 10, inflation rate (INF) has a significantly positive relationship with NPL in 
the current year, which is the same as the expectation, 1% increase in inflation rate leads to 0.09% increase in NPL. 
The explanation could be that higher inflation usually means higher interest rates. Although wages may keep pace 
with inflation, inflation just causes nominal wages to rise. Therefore, borrowers have to pay more interest on the 
loan, reducing the debt-servicing capacity. 
However, the statistical evidence shows that unemployment rate (UNER) has a negative impact on bad debt. 
1% increase in unemployment rate will reduce 0.21% of NPL. Despite of being opposite with the expected sign, 
it is understandable that Vietnam has learnt a great lesson after the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, during 
recession, to deal with unemployment issue, banks tend to tighten the borrowing policies such as setting stricter 
requirements for potential borrowers, increasing loan provision and capital adequacy ratio (CAR), so that they can 
lower the amount of bad debt. 
5.3.2  Effect of bank-specific factors on NPLs 
It can be seen that NPL from the previous year (NPLs(-1)) is the most significant variable with an extremely small 
p-value. It also has the biggest influence on NPLs in Vietnam. As demonstrated by the model, 1% increase in the 
NPL from previous year results in 0.64% increase in the NPL of the current year. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the high level of bad debt from previous year forces banks to be more cautious when deciding 
the amount of loans to customers in the current year, thus increasing the ratio of NPLs. 
The other significant determinant of NPLs is the size of the banks (log(SIZE)), whose t-statistic equals 4.004. 
In particular, banks’ size has a positive relationship with NPLs. Every 1% change in the size will lead to a constant 
0.000582% change in NPL. This result is totally suitable with the findings by Dao and Do (2013), which indicates 
that the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis is correct in the context of Vietnam. Although its coefficient is so small, it is 
undeniable that moral hazard does exist in listed banking system, and the larger banks tend to expose riskier 
activities. 
Meanwhile, return on equity (ROE) is the bank-specific factor which is most negatively related to NPLs. 
Each 1% increase in ROE will result in the decrease of 0.035% in the level on NPL. Bad debt is an expense in 
Income Statement. A high ROE means that banks have improve expense efficiency, which directly and/or 
indirectly related to better control over credit risks. It seems that thanks to the good lending procedure, it will not 
only create a higher profit but also lower the amount of bad debt. 
Inefficiency (INEF) is also an important factor which has a negative effect on NPLs, following the above 
expectation. Again, it emphasizes the important of loan procedure. If banks are more careful in implementing the 
lending process, although it will face with higher operating expenses, it will lower bad debt level. An increase of 
1% in inefficiency ratio will reduce 0.000588% of NPL. 
Another determinant which negatively affects listed banks’ NPL is the ownership structure. In the scope of 
this research, ownership structure is presented as a dummy variable (STATE). It equals 1 for state-owned banks 
and 0 for the other cases. Although the statistical evidence is not strong, the p-value (0.0798) is really close to the 
significant level of 0.05. Therefore, ownership structure is still considered as an essential factor of NPLs. 
According to the test result, the state-owned banks have a 0.0033% decrease in NPLs level compared to non-state-
owned banks, which correlates with the earlier literature. In Vietnam, there are only three listed banks that are also 
state-owned banks, which are BIDV, VietinBank, and Vietcombank. They are not only state- owned but also very 
big in scale. Hence, it is undeniable that these banks have received a greater support from the State Bank of 
Vietnam. 
The model also employed an interaction term - multiply slope variable by dummy variable, which is 
STATE*ROE. It is significant to conclude that an increase of 1% in return on equity of state- owned banks will 
lead to 0.037% increase in NPLs level. Even though ROE has a negative relationship with NPLs, when it interacts 
with the ownership structure, the sign has changed because the size aspect has dominated in this collaboration. 
State-owned banks are among the largest banks, which are so interconnected with the economic system in Vietnam, 
and moreover, they belong to State Bank of Vietnam. Thus, these banks are allowed to get involved in riskier 
financial activities, which increases the amount of bad debt. However, the NPLs level of these banks is always 
kept under the strict control by SBV to maintain a healthy NPLs ratio. 
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6. Summary, conclusion and recommendations 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This study using panel data methodology attempted to ascertain the effect of macroeconomic and bank-specific 
factors on the level of NPLs in 17 listed banks in Vietnam’s Stock Exchange for the period of 2009 - 2018. The 
macroeconomic determinants included in the research model were: Inflation rate and Unemployment rate; and 
bank-specific determinants were: Return on Equity, Banks’ size, Inefficiency, and NPLs from previous year. 
Applying multi-linear regression for panel data and using EViews and R package for analysis, the pooled 
effect model was chosen. To understand the relationship among variables, an interaction term between STATE 
and ROE was added to the model. The new as well as final model has seven out of eight variables which are 
statistically significant with the adjusted R-squared of 56.48%. 
As to the test results, bank-specific determinants contribute to the NPLs level more than macroeconomic 
determinants. In detail, there are two macroeconomic variables and five bank- specific variables in the final model. 
Besides, the findings are in agreement with the expectations concluded from earlier studies except for 
unemployment rate. In particular, Inflation, banks’ size, and NPLs from previous year are positively related to 
NPLs, while unemployment rate, return on equity, inefficiency, and ownership structure have a negative 
relationship with NPLs. 
 
6.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the earlier conceptual argument and context of the research, macroeconomic and bank- specific factors do 
affect the level of NPL. From the findings in the study, it is evident that Multi-linear regression model for panel 
data is appropriate to identify the determinants of NPLs. 
Besides, some recommendations are proposed with the aim at preventing the increase on NPLs in the system 
and avoid bad debt crisis. 
First of all, it is logically to conclude that NPLs from previous year (NPLs(-1)) will significantly contribute 
to its level in the current year. It implies that banks should solved this problem as quickly as possible before it 
worsens the situation and leaves severe consequences. 
Secondly, unemployment rate is also a big concern for banking system. Although the model in this research 
has proved that unemployment rate has a negative relationship with NPLs, it does not mean Vietnam should raise 
unemployment rate to lower the level of NPLs. Instead, it indicates that banks should be more cautious and 
continue to implement strict lending policy to prevent the bad debt crisis. 
The third issue is banks’ size because it implies the moral hazard of “too-big-to-fail” that has long existed in 
the Vietnamese banking system. Therefore, in order to change its, SBV should take action to tighten the control 
of the operation of big banks such as harsh punishment of regulation violation to prevent the huge losses and set 
examples for other banks. 
Last but not least, cost management, risk management, and lending policies are extremely critical for banks, 
especially lending policies, to effectively manage bad debts. The results from model recommends that the financial 
institutions should assign resources so as to improve and complete the credit scoring models, quality of personnel 
and each components of lending procedure. In addition, Basel II is an optimal proxy for banks in lending process 
operation, implementation, and supervision. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
It is inevitable that the research has to face with several limitations include: the research did not cover a broad time 
frame because 170 observations are not the optimal number for multi-linear regression model. Another limitation 
is that due to the unavailability of the information, quarter data could not be taken in consideration and lower the 
number of observations, so that it limits the scope of time lag effect. Thirdly, the study tends to oversimplify the 
situation by not properly investigating the possibility that variables can vary among individuals and time. Hence, 
the final model can be invalid in some circumstances. Last but not least, the research was guided by 14 initial 
variables, which cannot conclusively elaborate effects of macroeconomic and bank-specific factors on NPLs. Thus, 
it may not be enough to estimate the best regression model for NPLs. 
For future development of this research, there are various options that can be considered. First of all, a study 
that covers more variables with longer time span, especially quarter data, than the ones used in this study can give 
clearer effect of macroeconomic and bank-specific factors on NPLs. Other is that further study can be done 
addressing the effect of heterogeneity among variables to provide a deeper understanding about NPLs. 
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